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EconomicsThe industry and companies Basic 26 min read

The oil industry in history: demand, supply and prices

Oil industry history is the story of how demand for oil, oil production and the oil price have changed since the middle of the 19th century. The rules of the market have changed with them: who owned the fields, who tried to manage the price, and how. The oil price is set by world demand and supply. But both depend on wars and politics, on technology, and on investment decisions taken years earlier.

Why it matters

An oil project lasts 20–30 years, and over such a span the oil price has more than once at least doubled or halved. History shows why this happens. It shows which forces, over time, pull the price back towards the cost of new oil. It also shows which turns of events we should not treat as impossible. And it explains why most reserves today are in the hands of state-owned companies, and why Kazakhstan coordinates its production with the OPEC+ countries (the members of OPEC, the oil exporters' organisation, and the producers that cooperate with them).

Quick refresher

  • Within a few months the demand for oil and its production hardly respond to the price: the vehicles, plants and wells are already there. That is why the loss of 2% of world supply can raise the price by about 14%, and an equal surplus can push it down almost as far.
  • Over years the response is much stronger: consumers use less oil and switch to other fuels, and producers find new oil and start producing it. After the shocks of 1973 and 1979 world consumption fell, production outside OPEC grew, and in 1986 the price fell by almost half.
  • Producing from wells that are already drilled is cheap; new oil is expensive. When there is a surplus of oil, the price can stay below the cost of new production for a long time, so the industry has repeatedly tried to manage supply: the Standard Oil trust, production limits in Texas, agreements between companies, OPEC, OPEC+.
  • Prices of different years are compared in constant dollars. In 2025 dollars a barrel cost about $148 in 1980 and about $111 in 2022: the shock of 1979–1980 was the stronger one.
  • The buffers against disruptions are commercial stocks (held by companies), emergency stocks (held by governments) and spare production capacity (production that can be added quickly). Stocks run out: the 400 million barrels that the members of the International Energy Agency (IEA) agreed to release in 2026 equalled about 5 weeks of the production that was shut in at its peak.
  • Kazakhstan has been producing oil since 1899. In 2025 it produced 99.4 million tonnes of crude oil and condensate (the light liquid that comes out of gas fields), about 2.1% of world production. Since 2016 the country has taken part in the OPEC+ agreements.
Key relationships
P1P0=(1−s) 1/(εd−εs)\dfrac{P_1}{P_0} = (1 - s)^{\,1/(\varepsilon_d - \varepsilon_s)}

the price after a share ss of world supply is lost, with constant elasticities of demand εd<0\varepsilon_d < 0 and of supply εs>0\varepsilon_s > 0

Ptreal=Pt IbItP^{\text{real}}_t = P_t\,\dfrac{I_b}{I_t}

the price of year tt in the money of base year bb, using the consumer price index II

g=(Q1Q0)1/n−1g = \left(\dfrac{Q_1}{Q_0}\right)^{1/n} - 1

the average annual growth rate over nn years

Common pitfalls
  • Comparing nominal prices of different decades (each in the money of its own year): the 1980 dollar bought almost four times as much as the 2025 dollar.
  • Treating today's price as the norm for the whole life of a project: in December 1998 a barrel of Brent cost about $9, and in July 2008 about $144.
  • Expecting the price to stay high after a shock: after a few years demand and supply respond to it far more strongly than in the first months.
  • Mixing up tonnes and barrels: in Kazakhstan production is reported in tonnes, while on the world market and in the OPEC+ agreements it is reported in barrels per day, and the number of barrels in a tonne depends on the density of the oil.

After this lesson you can

  • explain why, in the short run, the oil price responds so strongly to small changes in demand and supply, and estimate the price rise when part of the supply is lost
  • convert the prices of different years into constant dollars (dollars of one chosen year, with inflation removed) and compare them
  • describe the main eras of the industry — from kerosene and Standard Oil to the “Seven Sisters” (the seven big international oil companies), OPEC, prices set on exchanges, shale oil and OPEC+ — and say what each of them left in the way today's market is organised
  • explain why the price shocks of the 1970s ended in the price collapse of 1986, and how stocks and spare capacity protect the market from disruptions
  • tell the story of Kazakhstan's oil — from Emba and Mangyshlak to Tengiz, Kashagan and the export pipelines — with dates and production volumes

How the oil market works

Oil is a commodity — a standard raw material that is traded all over the world. It is produced in dozens of countries, shipped by tanker and pipeline, and sold at prices tied to a few benchmark crudes (reference grades of oil whose prices the other grades follow), above all Brent, WTI and Dubai. A single company, however large, usually cannot move the world price and has to take it as given. Only countries with large production can influence the price, and even they can do so only if they act together.

Demand for oil depends on economic growth, on transport (gasoline, diesel and jet fuel), on petrochemicals and on the price itself. Supply has two parts: production from the fields that already work, which falls over time, and new fields, which take years to bring into production. Tengiz was discovered in 1979, and its integrated process trains (the plant lines that treat the oil and gas) started up in 1991. Kashagan was discovered in 2000 and produced its first oil in 2013 (phased start-up).

The main feature of the market is this: in the short run, within months, neither demand nor supply responds much to the price. The vehicles, aircraft and plants have already been bought, and they need as much oil as before. The wells have already been drilled. Only a producer with spare production capacity can add output quickly. This is production that can be started within 30 days and kept up for at least 90 days (the definition of the US Energy Information Administration, EIA). Most of the world's spare capacity is in the countries of OPEC (the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries), and historically most of all in Saudi Arabia.

How strongly the quantity responds to the price is shown by price elasticity. It is the ratio of the percentage change in quantity to the percentage change in price. For demand it is negative (the more expensive the oil, the less is bought); for supply it is positive. A demand elasticity of −0.1 means that a 10% rise in price reduces consumption by about 1%.

Price elasticity of demand or supply
ε=ΔQ/QΔP/P\varepsilon = \frac{\Delta Q / Q}{\Delta P / P}
where:
  • ε\varepsilonprice elasticity: of demand (εd\varepsilon_d, negative) or of supply (εs\varepsilon_s, positive), —
  • Q, ΔQQ,\ \Delta Qquantity — consumption or production — and its change, million bbl/d
  • P, ΔPP,\ \Delta Pprice and its change, $/bbl

Units: any units: a ratio of relative changes is dimensionless

Holds when
  • changes are small; for large changes, use the constant-elasticity model (below)
  • everything else — incomes, technology, policy — stays unchanged
  • elasticity depends on the time allowed: after months its size (ignoring the sign) is much smaller than after years

If the demand elasticity is smaller than one in size (ignoring its sign), demand is inelastic, which means that it responds weakly. When the price rises, purchases fall by a smaller proportion than the price rises, so sellers' revenue grows. Short-run demand for oil is exactly like that.

Suppose that a share ss of world supply suddenly leaves the market, because of a war, an accident or a decision by producers. The price rises until consumption has fallen and production elsewhere has grown enough to close the gap. If the elasticities are constant, we can find the new price exactly (the derivation is in the advanced section at the end of the lesson):

Price after part of the supply is lost
P1P0=(1−s) 1/(εd−εs)\frac{P_1}{P_0} = (1 - s)^{\,1/(\varepsilon_d - \varepsilon_s)}
where:
  • P0, P1P_0,\ P_1the price before the disruption and the price at which the market is balanced again, $/bbl
  • ssthe share of world supply that has left the market, fraction
  • εd, εs\varepsilon_d,\ \varepsilon_selasticities of demand and of supply over the period considered, —

Units: dimensionless; ss is a fraction

Holds when
  • demand and supply have constant elasticities: Q=A PεdQ = A\,P^{\varepsilon_d} and Q=B PεsQ = B\,P^{\varepsilon_s}; the disruption multiplies supply at any price by 1−s1 - s
  • no stocks are released, and spare capacity enters supply only in the way εs\varepsilon_s describes
  • this is a teaching model: it shows roughly how large the effect is and in which direction it goes, but it is not a price forecast

The smaller the difference εd−εs\varepsilon_d - \varepsilon_s is in size (ignoring its sign), the more strongly the price responds to the same loss. For small ss, the price rise P1/P0−1P_1/P_0 - 1 is about s/(εs−εd)s/(\varepsilon_s - \varepsilon_d). The exact formula gives a larger rise, and the larger the loss, the bigger the difference.

Oil price rise against the share of world supply lost, for short-run and long-run elasticities012345010203040Supply lost, %Price rise, %+14.4%+2.9%after monthsafter years

Chart: the horizontal axis shows the share of supply lost, from 0 to 5 per cent; the vertical axis shows the price rise, from 0 to 45 per cent. The solid curve rises ever more steeply and at 5 per cent reaches a price rise of about 41 per cent. The dashed curve is almost straight and gives about 8 per cent at 5 per cent. A vertical dashed line at 2 per cent marks the points of the example: plus 14.4 per cent on the solid curve and plus 2.9 per cent on the dashed one.

CalculatedPrice rise against the share of world supply lost, from the formula above. The solid line uses the elasticities of the first months (demand −0.10, supply +0.05). The dashed line uses those after several years (−0.40 and +0.30). The elasticity values are assumed.
Worked exampleLosing 2% of world supply: what happens to the price
Given (assumed data)
Left the market
2% of world supply (assumed)
Price before the disruption P0P_0
$70/bbl (assumed)
Elasticities after a few months
demand −0.10, supply +0.05 (assumption of the example)
Elasticities after a few years
demand −0.40, supply +0.30 (assumption of the example)
Solution
  1. After months: εd−εs=−0.10−0.05=−0.15\varepsilon_d - \varepsilon_s = -0.10 - 0.05 = -0.15, and P1/P0=0.981/(−0.15)=1.1442P_1/P_0 = 0.98^{1/(-0.15)} = 1.1442 — the price is 14.4% higher, about $80.1/bbl.
  2. How the 2% gap was closed: consumption fell by (1−1.1442−0.10)⋅100=1.34(1 - 1.1442^{-0.10})\cdot100 = 1.34%, and production elsewhere rose by (1.14420.05−1)⋅98=0.66(1.1442^{0.05} - 1)\cdot98 = 0.66% of the former supply — together 2%.
  3. After years: εd−εs=−0.40−0.30=−0.70\varepsilon_d - \varepsilon_s = -0.40 - 0.30 = -0.70, and P1/P0=0.981/(−0.70)=1.0293P_1/P_0 = 0.98^{1/(-0.70)} = 1.0293 — the price is only 2.9% higher, about $72/bbl.
Answer: In the first months the price will rise by about 14.4% (to $80.1/bbl), and by only 2.9% once demand and supply have had time to adjust.

What it means. To close a shortfall of 2% within a few months, the market has to “squeeze out” part of the demand through the price: buyers cut their purchases only when oil becomes really expensive. That is why the price jumps so much in a disruption. It is also why stocks and spare capacity are so valuable: they replace part of the loss, so the price does not have to rise to the level at which demand would fall on its own. The elasticities in the example are assumed values of about the right size, not measurements. What matters is how they compare: in the first months the market responds several times more weakly than after years. The data in this example are assumed for illustration.

Buffers. A disruption is met first from stocks. Commercial stocks sit in tanks, pipelines and tankers; emergency stocks are held by governments. The member countries of the International Energy Agency (IEA), created in 1974 after the first oil shock, hold emergency oil stocks. By joint decision they have released them to the market six times: in 1991, 2005 and 2011, twice in 2022, and in 2026. Spare capacity is used next. Both buffers are limited, and if the disruption drags on, it is the price that restores the balance.

The long run. Over years the price is pulled towards the cost of the most expensive barrel that is still needed to meet demand. If the price stays above this cost for a long time, companies invest more in exploration and development, and a few years later new oil reaches the market. If it stays below, they cut investment, and years later there is not enough supply (the investment cycle of companies). The lesson on unit costs shows how the cost per barrel relates to the break-even price of a project. The lesson Market, financial and regulatory uncertainty shows how project appraisal takes price uncertainty into account.

The price over a century and a half: nominal and in constant dollars

We cannot compare the price of 1970 directly with the price of 2025: since then the dollar has lost so much of its value that it buys many times less. So the prices of different years are converted into real terms, that is, into the money of a single year. For this we use the consumer price index, which shows how the prices of everyday goods and services change (money of the day and real terms).

Price of a past year in the money of the base year
Ptreal=Pt IbItP^{\text{real}}_t = P_t\,\frac{I_b}{I_t}
where:
  • PtP_tprice in the money of its own year tt (nominal), $/bbl
  • PtrealP^{\text{real}}_tthe same price in the money of the base year bb, $/bbl
  • It, IbI_t,\ I_bconsumer price index in year tt and in the base year bb, —

Units: prices in one currency, indices from one series

Holds when
  • the index describes the purchasing power of the money of whoever makes the comparison; for prices in dollars, this is the US consumer price index
  • the annual average price is divided by the annual average index

The ratio of the indices shows how many times more the dollar of year tt bought than the dollar of the base year.

Annual average oil price from 1861 to 2025 in 2025 dollars and in nominal dollars186019001940198020200306090120150180YearUS$ per barrelin 2025 dollarsin money of the day186419802011

Chart: the horizontal axis shows the years from 1860 to 2025; the vertical axis shows the price from 0 to 180 dollars per barrel. The solid line is the price in 2025 dollars: a sharp peak of 170 in 1864, then a fall to 20–50; a minimum of about 14 in 1931; from 1946 to 1973 it stays within 15–27; a jump in 1974 and a peak of 148 in 1980; a fall to 25 in 1998; peaks of 145 in 2008 and 159 in 2011; 69 in 2025. The dashed line is the price in the money of its own year: close to zero until 1973, then it follows the shape of the solid line below it and meets it in 2025.

CalculatedAnnual average oil price, 1861–2025. 1861–1975: Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy 2026 — the average US price before 1945, then the posted price of Saudi Arabian Light at the port of Ras Tanura; 1976–1987: World Bank, Commodity Price Data (CC BY 4.0) — the price of Saudi Arabian Light in 1976–1978 and Brent from 1979; from 1988: the annual average Brent spot price (the price for immediate delivery), based on data of the US Energy Information Administration (EIA). The series is converted into 2025 dollars with the US consumer price index: from 1976 with the CPI-U of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics; for 1861–1975 with the Energy Institute's conversion, brought to the same 2025 price level.
Eras of the oil market and the average price in 2025 dollars
Years
1861–1879
Who influenced the price most
the first oil fields, free competition
Average price, $/bbl
74
What to remember
booms and busts in Pennsylvania
Years
1880–1913
Who influenced the price most
the Standard Oil trust
Average price, $/bbl
31
What to remember
kerosene, then gasoline
Years
1914–1945
Who influenced the price most
companies and the regulation of production in the US
Average price, $/bbl
27
What to remember
the automobile; the collapse of 1931
Years
1946–1973
Who influenced the price most
the “Seven Sisters”
Average price, $/bbl
21
What to remember
cheap Middle East oil
Years
1974–1985
Who influenced the price most
OPEC
Average price, $/bbl
95
What to remember
the shocks of 1973 and 1979
Years
1986–2003
Who influenced the price most
the market and prices set on exchanges
Average price, $/bbl
43
What to remember
the collapse of 1986, the cheap 1990s
Years
2004–2014
Who influenced the price most
the market; rapid growth of demand in Asia
Average price, $/bbl
121
What to remember
the supercycle, the peak of 2008
Years
2015–2025
Who influenced the price most
the market, shale oil, OPEC+
Average price, $/bbl
78
What to remember
the collapse of 2014–2016, the pandemic, 2022

Average over the years of each period, from the series in the figure. The division into eras is approximate.

Worked exampleWhen was oil more expensive: in 1980 or in 2022
Given (assumed data)
Annual average price
1980: $37.9/bbl; 2022: $100.93/bbl (the series of the figure)
US consumer price index, annual average (1982–1984 = 100)
1980: 82.4; 2022: 292.655; 2025: 321.943
Solution
  1. 1980 in 2025 dollars: 37.9⋅321.943/82.4=148.137.9\cdot321.943/82.4 = 148.1 $/bbl
  2. 2022: 100.93⋅321.943/292.655=111.0100.93\cdot321.943/292.655 = 111.0 $/bbl
  3. The ratio 148.1/111.0=1.334148.1/111.0 = 1.334: in 1980 oil was 33% more expensive, although its nominal price was 100.93/37.9=2.66100.93/37.9 = 2.66 times lower.
Answer: In constant dollars a barrel cost about $148.1 in 1980 and about $111.0 in 2022: oil was more expensive in 1980.

What it means. The nominal peaks of 2008 and 2022 are easier to remember. But in constant dollars 2022 is clearly cheaper than 1980. The annual average price of 2008 ($145/bbl in 2025 money) is almost the same as the price of 1980. In the 20th and 21st centuries oil was most expensive in 2011 (159). From 1976 the series in the figure is converted in the same way and with the same index, so the chart shows the same 148.1 and 111.0 $/bbl. The practical conclusion: compare a price forecast in real money with history in real money too.

Annual averages smooth out the swings of the market: within a single year the range can be much wider. The Brent spot price (“Europe Brent Spot Price FOB” in the EIA series) reached $143.95/bbl on 3 July 2008 and $33.73 on 26 December of the same year.

1859–1945: kerosene, gasoline and the first attempts to manage the market

People knew about oil earlier, but the start of commercial production is usually dated to 27 August 1859. On that day Edwin Drake struck oil with a well about 21 m deep, near the town of Titusville in Pennsylvania. The main product then was kerosene, a fuel for lamps, which replaced whale oil. New wells kept flooding the market, and the price rose and fell several times over: in 2025 dollars, from $170/bbl in 1864 to $34 in 1874.

John Rockefeller brought order to the chaos in his own way. His company, Standard Oil, was founded in 1870 as a refiner. It bought up its competitors and became a trust in 1882 (a group of companies run as one). It controlled US refining and pipelines almost like a monopoly (a single seller). On 15 May 1911 the US Supreme Court ordered it to break up under the antitrust law, the law against monopolies. More than 30 independent companies emerged from the trust. The heirs of some of them, ExxonMobil and Chevron, are still among the world's largest oil companies today.

Around the turn of the century oil began to flow in many countries. On 10 January 1901 a gusher (a well that spouts oil under its own pressure) on the Spindletop salt dome in Texas produced, according to estimates, about 100 thousand bbl/d. A salt dome is a dome-shaped mass of salt that can trap oil. The future major companies Texaco and Gulf grew on Texas oil. In May 1908 the first commercial oil in the Middle East was struck at Masjed Soleyman in Persia. In 1909 the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the predecessor of today's BP, was created to produce it (the D'Arcy concession; a concession is the right, given by a government, to produce oil in an area). In Kazakhstan the first oil gusher came from a well at the Karashungul area in 1899 (see the section on Kazakhstan below). As the automobile spread, gasoline became the main product, and navies began to switch from coal to oil fuel. In 1914 the British government bought a controlling stake in the Anglo-Persian company to secure oil for the fleet. Oil was becoming a strategic raw material.

Why was the industry so drawn to agreements? Finding and developing a field is expensive, while producing from wells that are already drilled is cheap. When there is too much oil, each producer is ready to sell at almost any price above its running costs, and the price falls so low that the investments already made do not pay back. The way out was sought in limiting supply.

In 1928 the largest companies made two agreements. In the Red Line Agreement, the partners in the Turkish (later Iraq) Petroleum Company promised not to develop fields on the lands of the former Ottoman Empire except together. The partners were the Anglo-Persian company, Royal Dutch Shell, the French CFP and a group of American companies. In the “As-Is” agreement, made at Achnacarry Castle in Scotland, the heads of the Anglo-Persian company, Shell and Standard Oil of New Jersey agreed to keep their existing market shares.

More important was the experience of Texas. The huge East Texas field was discovered on 3 October 1930. By the middle of summer 1931 it was producing about 900 thousand bbl/d, and the field price of oil fell from 99 cents to 13 cents a barrel. The governor declared martial law in the field. The Railroad Commission of Texas, which regulated production in the state, began to limit it with quotas set according to demand. In 1935 a federal law banned the shipment between states of oil produced above the quotas. This is how a regulator appeared that managed the price through the volume of production. OPEC and OPEC+ would later act in a similar way, by limiting production.

Producing countries also began to take oil under their own control. On 18 March 1938 Mexico took over the property of foreign oil companies (expropriated it) and created the state monopoly PEMEX. In the same year, 1938, commercial oil was found in Saudi Arabia, at the “Dammam No. 7” well, under the concession granted in 1933 to Standard Oil of California.

1945–1973: the “Seven Sisters”, cheap oil and the birth of OPEC

After the Second World War oil consumption grew rapidly. From 1965 to 1973 world consumption rose from 30.9 to 56.1 million bbl/d (the example in the next section calculates the growth rate). At the same time oil became cheaper: in 2025 dollars a barrel cost $15–27, and in 1970 $15, less than in any year since 1931. Almost half of the growth in world production in 1965–1973 came from the Middle East, with its huge fields that are cheap to develop. Its share rose from 27 to 37%.

Most of the oil outside the US and the USSR was produced and sold by seven international companies — the “Seven Sisters” (the name is credited to Enrico Mattei, the head of the Italian company ENI): Standard Oil of New Jersey, Socony-Vacuum, Standard Oil of California, Gulf, Texaco, Royal Dutch Shell and Anglo-Iranian. Since then, mergers have left four of them: ExxonMobil, Chevron, Shell and BP. They owned the concessions, pipelines, tankers and refineries, and decided for themselves where and how much to produce (concessions).

The taxes and payments of the host countries (the countries where the companies worked) were worked out from the posted price, a price that the companies announced themselves. When there was too much oil, the companies began to cut the posted prices, and with them the incomes of the producing countries. The latest cut came in August 1960. The producing countries answered it with a meeting in Baghdad on 10–14 September, where Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela founded the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

Step by step, the producing countries took control of their oil away from the concession holders. Iran nationalised its oil industry (took it into state ownership) in 1951. In the 1970s governments bought out shares in the concessions: the Saudi government took 25% of Aramco in 1973, 60% in 1974 and 100% by 1980. This is how the largest state-owned (national) oil companies appeared. Today they own most of the reserves (types of oil companies).

1973–1986: price shocks and their consequences

US crude oil production reached its maximum in 1970, at 9.6 million bbl/d, and then began to decline, while world demand kept growing. In October 1973, during the Arab–Israeli war, the Arab oil-exporting countries cut production and declared an embargo (a ban on supplying oil) against the US and several other countries. By January 1974 the price had quadrupled, from about $2.90 to $11.65/bbl. The embargo was lifted in March 1974, but the price stayed high.

The second shock came from the revolution in Iran: by January 1979 production there had fallen by 4.8 million bbl/d, about 7% of world production. From April 1979 to April 1980 the price more than doubled. The annual average price of 1980 was $37.9/bbl, about $148 in 2025 money.

The shocks changed everyone's behaviour. The consuming countries created the IEA in 1974 and began to hold emergency stocks. Consumers used less oil and switched to other fuels: world oil consumption fell from 64.3 million bbl/d in 1979 to 58.0 in 1983 and returned to the 1979 level only in 1988. According to a World Bank estimate, by 2015 the oil intensity of the world economy (the oil used per unit of output) had fallen by almost half compared with the 1970s.

The high price made expensive oil outside OPEC profitable. From 1973 to 1983 the North Sea and the Gulf of Mexico added about 6 million bbl/d. OPEC tried to hold the price by cutting production: its supplies fell from 30 million bbl/d in 1979 to 16 million in 1985, and Saudi Arabia's production fell about threefold between 1980 and 1985. Even so, the price kept falling in real terms. At the end of 1985 OPEC gave up defending the price and raised its supplies from 13.7 million bbl/d in June to 18 million in December. In 1986 the annual average price fell by almost half, from $27.3 to $14.8/bbl. Cheap oil lasted for almost two decades.

World oil consumption from 1965 to 2025: the world total, OECD countries and all other countries1965197519851995200520152025020406080100YearMillion bbl/dworld totalOECD countriesall other countries

Chart: the horizontal axis shows the years from 1965 to 2025; the vertical axis shows consumption from 0 to 110 million barrels per day. World consumption rises rapidly from 31 to 56 by 1973 and to 64 by 1979, falls to 58 in 1983, and then grows almost continuously; there are dips in 2008–2009 and especially in 2020, when it fell from 98.6 to 89.8; in 2025 it is 103.0. OECD consumption rises to 45 in 1979, falls to 37 in 1983, reaches 50 in 2004–2005 and then stays at about 45. Consumption of all other countries rises from 8 in 1965 to 58 in 2025 and overtakes the OECD in 2013.

CalculatedWorld oil consumption, 1965–2025, million bbl/d: the world total, the OECD countries (mostly rich industrial countries) and all other countries. Data: Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy 2026.
Worked exampleHow the price shocks changed demand growth
Given (assumed data)
World oil consumption
1965: 30.9; 1973: 56.1; 1985: 59.3; 2025: 103.0 million bbl/d
Solution
  1. 1965–1973, 8 years: g=(56.1/30.9)1/8−1=0.0774g = (56.1/30.9)^{1/8} - 1 = 0.0774, that is 7.7% a year; at this rate consumption doubles in ln⁡2/ln⁡(1+g)=9.3\ln 2/\ln(1 + g) = 9.3 years.
  2. 1973–1985, 12 years: g=(59.3/56.1)1/12−1=0.0046g = (59.3/56.1)^{1/12} - 1 = 0.0046, or 0.46% a year.
  3. 1985–2025, 40 years: g=(103.0/59.3)1/40−1=0.0139g = (103.0/59.3)^{1/40} - 1 = 0.0139, or 1.39% a year.
Answer: Before the first shock consumption grew by 7.7% a year and doubled in 9.3 years; over the 12 years of the shocks growth almost stopped (0.46% a year), and after 1985 it was about 1.39% a year.

What it means. The high prices of the 1970s did what no agreements could have done: they changed the technology and the habits of consumers, and demand never again grew at its former pace. For an investor this is the main lesson of history: a price that is too high limits itself over time. The calculation uses only the end points of each period. Inside the periods there were both falls and jumps. (The doubling rule is in the lesson on compound interest.)

1986–2025: prices set on exchanges, the supercycle, shale oil and OPEC+

After 1986 the market itself began to set the price. Oil is sold on formulas tied to benchmark crudes, and the prices of the benchmark crudes are formed in daily trading, including on exchanges. For example, WTI futures (contracts to buy oil on a future date at a price fixed today) have traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange since 1983. The price became transparent, and just as volatile (it swings widely). In August 1990, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Brent spot price more than doubled in two months, from $19.93/bbl on 1 August to $41.45 on 27 September. In December 1998, after the Asian financial crisis, it fell as low as $9.10.

In the 2000s demand grew rapidly in the developing countries, above all China. China's oil consumption rose from 2.2 million bbl/d in 1990 to 9.3 million in 2010 and 17.4 million in 2025. Since 2013 the countries outside the OECD have used more oil than the OECD countries. The price rose almost without a break and reached $143.95/bbl on 3 July 2008. Then the global financial crisis knocked it down to $33.73 by the end of December. From 2011 to the middle of 2014 the average price of the three benchmark crudes (Brent, WTI and Dubai) stayed at about $105/bbl. According to a World Bank estimate, the fall of 2014 brought to an end the commodity “supercycle” (a long period of high prices for raw materials) that had begun in the early 2000s.

High prices paid for a new technology. Horizontal wells with multistage hydraulic fracturing (cracking the rock by pumping in fluid at high pressure; Horizontal wells, Hydraulic fracturing: purpose and well selection) made it possible to produce oil from tight rocks, which let fluid through only very slowly (rocks of low permeability). This is tight oil, which is more often called shale oil. US crude oil production had been falling since 1970, but it grew from 5.0 million bbl/d in 2008 to 13.7 million in 2025. According to an EIA estimate, in 2018 the US overtook Saudi Arabia and Russia and became the world's largest producer of crude oil. In December 2015 the US lifted the ban on exports of its crude oil that had been in force since 1975.

US crude oil production from 1900 to 2025, million barrels per day19001925195019752000202502468101214YearMillion bbl/d1970: 9.62008: 5.02025: 13.7

Chart: the horizontal axis shows the years from 1900 to 2025; the vertical axis shows production from 0 to 14 million barrels per day. The line rises from 0.2 in 1900 to a maximum of 9.6 in 1970, stays at about 8–9 until the mid-1980s, falls to 5.0 in 2008, and then climbs steeply, with dips in 2016 and 2020, to 13.7 in 2025. Three points are marked with labels: 1970, 2008 and 2025.

CalculatedUS crude oil production, 1900–2025, million bbl/d (EIA data): the maximum of 1970, the decline to 2008 and the growth thanks to tight oil.

Shale oil has different economics. A shale well goes from the start of its development to almost complete depletion in 2.5–3 years, and the investment in a single well is small. So shale production responds to the price much faster than an offshore field, which takes many years to prepare for production. Shale production costs a lot, but it is flexible. It has become the new “regulator” of the market: when the price is high it is quickly built up, and when the price is low drilling is quickly cut.

By 2014 supply had outrun demand. In November 2014 OPEC decided not to cut production but to keep it at 30 million bbl/d. In practice, it gave up supporting the price to protect its market share. The Brent spot price fell from $115.19/bbl on 19 June 2014 to $26.01/bbl on 20 January 2016. On 10 December 2016 the OPEC countries and 11 countries outside the organisation, including Russia and Kazakhstan, agreed to cut production together. The group called OPEC+ dates from this Declaration of Cooperation.

In 2020 the COVID-19 pandemic cut world oil consumption by about 9% — from 98.6 to 89.8 million bbl/d. On 20 April 2020 the exchange price of the WTI contract with the nearest delivery date fell below zero for the first time since trading began. Contract holders had nowhere to put the oil: at Cushing, Oklahoma, the delivery point, almost no free storage was left. In April 2020 OPEC+ agreed on a record production cut, by 9.7 million bbl/d from May.

In February 2022 Russia's war against Ukraine began; on 8 March the Brent spot price rose to $133.18/bbl, and the IEA countries released emergency stocks twice in the year. Then the market calmed down: in 2025 the annual average price of Brent was about $69/bbl, and world oil consumption was a record 103.0 million bbl/d.

The energy transition and the crisis of 2026

The share of oil in world primary energy consumption (all fuels and other energy sources, before conversion) is declining: about 50% in the mid-1970s, 40.6% in 2000 and 33.5% in 2025 (according to the Energy Institute). Gas, renewables and electric cars are growing. According to an IEA estimate, more than 20 million electric cars were sold in the world in 2025, a quarter of all new passenger cars. By the same estimate, the world's fleet of electric cars saved about 1.7 million bbl/d of oil in 2025. But in absolute numbers oil consumption is still growing, and in 2025 it was a record.

Nobody knows when growth will give way to decline, or how fast the decline will be. The forecasts of different organisations differ widely, and so do the scenarios of a single organisation. For a project that will produce oil for 20–30 years, this means uncertainty about price and demand. Project appraisal handles it with scenarios and ranges of values (scenarios, Market, financial and regulatory uncertainty).

2026 gave a fresh lesson about buffers. The armed conflict in the Middle East that began on 28 February 2026 almost halted oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz. According to an IEA estimate of 11 March, exports of oil and oil products through the strait fell below 10% of the pre-conflict level. In 2025 about 20 million bbl/d had passed through it, roughly a quarter of world seaborne oil trade. On the same day the IEA countries agreed to release 400 million barrels of emergency stocks to the market, the sixth and the largest such release since 1974. According to an EIA estimate, the crude oil production that was shut in peaked in May at 10.9 million bbl/d. The Brent spot price rose to $138.21/bbl on 7 April 2026.

Worked exampleHow long emergency stocks last
Given (assumed data)
Release of emergency stocks by the IEA countries (decision of 11 March 2026)
400 million barrels
Peak of shut-in crude oil production (May 2026, EIA estimate)
10.9 million bbl/d
Flow through the Strait of Hormuz before the conflict (2025)
about 20 million bbl/d
World oil consumption in 2025
103.0 million bbl/d
Solution
  1. If the stocks covered all the shut-in production at the peak: 400/10.9=36.7400/10.9 = 36.7 days, about 5 weeks.
  2. If the whole flow through the strait were left without replacement: 400/20=20400/20 = 20 days.
  3. For scale: 400 million barrels is 400/103.0=3.9400/103.0 = 3.9 days of world consumption.
Answer: The largest release of emergency stocks in history covered the peak loss of production for about 36.7 days — roughly 5 weeks.

What it means. Stocks buy time; they do not solve the problem. In the weeks that are gained, part of the oil finds another route, producers in other countries raise production, and consumers begin to save oil. If the disruption lasts for months, the price restores the balance, as in the example of the 2% loss of supply. The calculation is simplified: the release is spread over months, and other suppliers partly make up the loss.

Kazakhstan's oil: from Emba to Tengiz and Kashagan

The first oil gusher on the territory of Kazakhstan came in 1899 from well No. 7 at the Karashungul area in what is now the Atyrau Region. The history of oil production in the country is dated from this event. The search for oil in the Emba area began as early as 1892. The Dossor field was discovered in April 1911, Makat produced its first oil in 1915, and in 1922 the Embaneft trust was created to develop them. By the end of 1940 the fields of the Ural–Emba region were producing 750 thousand tonnes of oil a year, and by the end of the 1940s about 1 million tonnes.

A new stage began in Mangyshlak. In 1961 Uzen and Zhetybai were discovered, and in 1964 an oilfield administration was created to develop Uzen. Today it is Ozenmunaigas, which has produced more than 400 million tonnes of oil in 60 years. Mangyshlak oil contains a lot of wax: it solidifies even at temperatures above zero, so it is heated when it is gathered and pumped (waxes). In 1979 the giant fields Tengiz and Karachaganak were discovered in the Pre-Caspian Basin, and in 1984 Kumkol in the South Turgay Basin (petroleum basins of Kazakhstan). In 1985 the Kazakh SSR produced 22.7 million tonnes of crude oil and condensate, and in 1991 26.6 million tonnes.

In the first years of independence production declined, and in 1994 it fell to 20.3 million tonnes. To develop the largest fields the country brought in foreign companies. The Tengizchevroil joint venture was created in 1993, and in 1997 production sharing agreements were signed for the North Caspian and for Karachaganak (in such an agreement the state and the company share the oil produced; how the rules on the subsoil changed, Licences and contracts for subsoil use). In 2000 Kashagan was discovered offshore, on the shelf of the North Caspian.

Producing oil is not enough: it has to be exported, and Kazakhstan has no access to the open sea. In 2001 the pipeline of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) started operating. It is more than 1500 km long and runs from the fields of Western Kazakhstan to a marine terminal near Novorossiysk on the Black Sea. Most of the exports still go through it today. In 2006 the Atasu–Alashankou oil pipeline, a section of the Kazakhstan–China pipeline, opened a direct route for oil to China. With the new routes production grew: 35.3 million tonnes in 2000 and 79.7 million tonnes in 2010.

The national company KazMunayGas was created in 2002 (the companies of Kazakhstan's oil industry). Kashagan produced its first oil in 2013, but production had to be stopped. It was resumed only in 2016, after the pipelines were replaced (offshore development). Since 2016 Kazakhstan has taken part in the OPEC+ agreements, and under them it takes on commitments on its production level. In January 2025 the third plant at Tengiz produced its first oil. Production at the field grew in 2025 to about 39 million tonnes, and in the country as a whole to a record 99.4 million tonnes, which is 13.3% more than in 2024. That is 11th place in the world and about 2.1% of world oil production.

Production of crude oil and condensate in Kazakhstan from 1985 to 2025, million tonnes19851995200520152025020406080100YearMillion tonnes per year1994: 20.32001: CPC2016: Kashagan2025: 99.4

Chart: the horizontal axis shows the years from 1985 to 2025; the vertical axis shows production from 0 to 110 million tonnes. The line stays at about 23–27 until 1992, falls to 20.3 in 1994, and then rises: 40.1 in 2001, when the CPC started operating, and 79.7 in 2010; about 80 from 2010 to 2016, about 90 after production at Kashagan resumed in 2016, about 85 in 2020–2022, and 99.4 in 2025. The points for 1994, 2001, 2016 and 2025 are marked.

CalculatedProduction of crude oil and condensate in Kazakhstan, 1985–2025, million tonnes. Data: Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy 2026; the value for 2025 agrees with the data of the Bureau of National Statistics.

In 2026 production is lower than last year's: 61.7 million tonnes in January–August, which is 8.3% less than a year earlier. The government expects about 96 million tonnes for 2026 as a whole, instead of the 100.5 million tonnes assumed earlier, and the same in 2027. Kazakhstan's production level under OPEC+ for November 2026 is 1.628 million bbl/d. The lesson on taxation covers the tax regime and its changes.

Worked exampleKazakhstan's production in barrels per day
Given (assumed data)
Production of crude oil and condensate in 2025
99.4 million tonnes
Average density at 60 °F
0.80 or 0.85 t/m³ (assumption: a mixture of light oil and condensate from different fields)
World oil production in 2025
4701.1 million tonnes
Barrels per cubic metre
6.2898
Solution
  1. Barrels per tonne (density and barrels): 6.2898/0.80=7.866.2898/0.80 = 7.86 and 6.2898/0.85=7.406.2898/0.85 = 7.40.
  2. Per day at 0.80 t/m³: 99.4⋅7.86/365=2.1499.4\cdot7.86/365 = 2.14 million bbl/d; at 0.85 t/m³: 99.4⋅7.40/365=2.0299.4\cdot7.40/365 = 2.02 million bbl/d.
  3. Share of world production: 99.4/4701.1=2.1199.4/4701.1 = 2.11%.
Answer: 99.4 million tonnes a year is about 2.02–2.14 million bbl/d, or 2.11% of world oil production.

What it means. The same mass of oil gives a different number of barrels: light oil and condensate give more barrels per tonne. So when you compare Kazakhstan's production in tonnes with the OPEC+ levels in barrels per day, you need to know what is counted (crude oil only, or crude oil with condensate) and what density is used. Otherwise an error of a few per cent can easily pass for an overshoot or a shortfall against the commitments. The densities in this example are assumed for illustration.

Terms and symbols

Benchmark crude
A grade of oil whose price serves as a reference for the prices of other grades: Brent, WTI and Dubai.
Price elasticity
The ratio of the percentage change in demand or supply to the percentage change in price. For oil demand in the short run it is small, close to zero.
Spare production capacity
Production that can be started within 30 days and kept up for at least 90 days. It is mostly in the OPEC countries.
Emergency stocks
Oil stocks that governments hold in case of disruptions. The IEA countries have released them six times by joint decision.
Posted price
The price announced by the companies that held the concessions. Until the 1970s the payments to the host countries were worked out from it.
The “Seven Sisters”
Seven international companies that controlled most of the oil outside the US and the USSR in the 1940s–1970s.
OPEC and OPEC+
OPEC is the organisation of oil-exporting countries (since 1960). OPEC+ is the group formed by its production agreements with other producers (since 2016).
Tight oil
Oil from rocks of low permeability, produced by horizontal wells with multistage hydraulic fracturing. It is often called shale oil.
Constant dollars
Prices converted into the money of a single year using the consumer price index.

Common mistakes and misconceptions

Wrong

“Oil was most expensive in 2008 and 2022.”

In fact

These are the peaks that people remember: daily prices in nominal dollars. In 2025 money the annual average price of 1980 ($148/bbl) is higher than that of 2022 ($111) and almost equal to the price of 2008 ($145). In the 20th and 21st centuries oil was most expensive in 2011, at $159/bbl.

Wrong

“OPEC can hold the price high for as long as it likes.”

In fact

A high price reduces demand and makes production outside the cartel (the group of sellers that agree to limit supply) profitable. In 1979–1985 OPEC cut its supplies by almost half, but the price kept falling anyway, and in 1986 it collapsed. In 2014 OPEC chose to protect its market share instead of supporting the price.

Wrong

“If the price falls, production will drop at once.”

In fact

Wells that are already drilled keep producing as long as the price is above the running costs, so in the first months production hardly changes. What is cut first is investment in new wells, and supply falls later. Shale production responds to the price fastest of all.

Wrong

“Emergency stocks protect against any disruption.”

In fact

Stocks run out. The 400 million barrels, the largest release in history, which the IEA countries agreed in 2026, covered the peak loss of production for about 5 weeks.

Wrong

“99.4 million tonnes a year is a perfectly definite number of barrels per day.”

In fact

The number of barrels per tonne depends on density: at 0.80 t/m³ it gives about 2.14 million bbl/d, at 0.85 about 2.02.

In depth: advanced detail

Where the price-jump formula comes from and where it misleads

Before the disruption the market is balanced: A P0εd=B P0εsA\,P_0^{\varepsilon_d} = B\,P_0^{\varepsilon_s}. The disruption multiplies supply at any price by 1−s1 - s, and the new price P1P_1 again makes demand equal to supply: A P1εd=(1−s) B P1εsA\,P_1^{\varepsilon_d} = (1 - s)\,B\,P_1^{\varepsilon_s}. We divide the second equation by the first and get (P1/P0)εd−εs=1−s(P_1/P_0)^{\varepsilon_d - \varepsilon_s} = 1 - s. The formula of the lesson follows from this.

We take logarithms: ln⁡(P1/P0)=ln⁡(1−s)/(εd−εs)\ln(P_1/P_0) = \ln(1 - s)/(\varepsilon_d - \varepsilon_s). For small ss we can use ln⁡(1−s)≈−s\ln(1 - s) \approx -s, and the price rise is about s/(εs−εd)s/(\varepsilon_s - \varepsilon_d). The approximation understates the rise, and the more so the larger the loss:

Price rise with the elasticities of the first months (demand −0.10, supply +0.05)
Supply lost
1%
Exact formula
6.9%
Approximation
6.7%
Supply lost
2%
Exact formula
14.4%
Approximation
13.3%
Supply lost
5%
Exact formula
40.8%
Approximation
33.3%
Supply lost
10%
Exact formula
101.9%
Approximation
66.7%

The elasticities are teaching values. With a loss of 10%, the exact formula doubles the price.

Where the model misleads. Elasticity is not constant: at a very high price demand begins to fall more sharply, because some consumers simply stop buying. Stocks and spare capacity, which are not in the model, work first. The price also depends on expectations: if the market believes that the disruption will soon end, the price rises less; if it fears that the disruption will drag on, the price rises more. So the model is good for showing roughly how large the effect is and for understanding why the oil price reacts so sharply to disruptions. It is not good for a forecast.

Connections to other topics

Check yourself

  1. 1

    World oil supply suddenly decreased by 1%. In the coming months the elasticity of demand is −0.05 and that of supply +0.05. By roughly how much will the price rise?

    1. A.by about 10%
    2. B.by 1%
    3. C.by a factor of two
    4. D.by 5%
    Show the answer

    Correct answer: A. by about 10%

    By the formula of the lesson, P1/P0=0.991/(−0.05−0.05)P_1/P_0 = 0.99^{1/(-0.05 - 0.05)}, that is 0.99−10≈1.1060.99^{-10} \approx 1.106. This is a rise of about 10.6%. The weaker the response of demand and supply, the bigger the jump: the market has to cut demand through the price.

  2. 2

    In 1974 a barrel cost $11.58 on average, and in 2016 $43.64. From 1974 to 2025 US consumer prices rose about 6.53 times, and from 2016 to 2025 they rose 1.34 times. When was oil more expensive in 2025 money?

    1. A.in 2016
    2. B.in 1974
    3. C.the same
    Show the answer

    Correct answer: B. in 1974

    11.58⋅6.53≈75.611.58\cdot6.53 \approx 75.6 $/bbl against 43.64⋅1.34≈58.543.64\cdot1.34 \approx 58.5: in 1974 oil was more expensive, although its nominal price was almost four times lower.

  3. 3

    Why did the price shocks of 1973 and 1979 end in the price collapse of 1986?

    Show the answer

    The high price worked against itself. Consumers used less oil and switched to other fuels: world consumption fell from 64.3 million bbl/d in 1979 to 58.0 in 1983. Expensive oil from the North Sea and the Gulf of Mexico paid for itself and added about 6 million bbl/d. OPEC held the price by cutting supplies from 30 to 16 million bbl/d, and lost market share. At the end of 1985 it gave up defending the price and raised production, and the annual average price fell from $27.3 to $14.8/bbl.

  4. 4

    Which production responds fastest to a rise in the oil price?

    1. A.building an export pipeline
    2. B.exploration in a new basin
    3. C.drilling wells in tight (shale) reservoirs
    4. D.a new offshore field
    Show the answer

    Correct answer: C. drilling wells in tight (shale) reservoirs

    A well in a tight reservoir is drilled and starts producing within months, and it goes from the start of development to almost complete depletion in 2.5–3 years. An offshore field, exploration and a pipeline take years to prepare. That is why shale production responds to the price faster than the others.

  5. 5

    How do emergency stocks differ from spare capacity as protection against supply disruptions?

    Show the answer

    Stocks are an amount of oil (a volume). They can be released quickly, but they run out: the 400 million barrels in 2026 covered the peak loss of production for about 5 weeks. Spare capacity is a rate (barrels per day): production that can be started within 30 days and kept up for at least 90 days. It is mostly in the OPEC countries. If a disruption hits the same countries or export routes where the spare capacity is concentrated, this buffer does not help.

  6. 6

    In 2025 Kazakhstan produced 99.4 million tonnes of crude oil and condensate. Why can this number not be compared directly with the OPEC+ production level of 1.628 million bbl/d?

    Show the answer

    Tonnes a year and barrels a day are different units. To convert, divide the annual production by 365 and multiply by the number of barrels per tonne. This number depends on density: it is 7.86 at 0.80 t/m³ and 7.40 at 0.85. You also need to know what is included in each of the numbers being compared (crude oil only, or crude oil with condensate).

Updated: 19 October 2026